

# Canada's IRIDA Project for Infectious Disease Genomic Epidemiology

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EFSA 20<sup>th</sup> Colloquium  
June 16 2014



PROTECTING CANADIANS FROM ILLNESS



Public Health  
Agency of Canada

Agence de la santé  
publique du Canada


Canada

A grayscale electron micrograph of a bacterium, likely Listeria monocytogenes, showing its characteristic rod shape and flagella. The bacterium is positioned in the upper right quadrant of the frame. The background is a light gray, textured surface with some faint, wavy lines.


**2008**

***Canadian Nationwide  
Listeriosis Outbreak***

PFGE variation detected by  
**PulseNet Canada**




# Prophage accounts for PFGE variation





# Circular Chromosomal Map

*Listeria monocytogenes* 08-5578




# *SNPs and InDels* inform **Evolution**





0.03

RTE = ready to eat  
 nawd = not associated with disease  
 [F]GID = [febrile] gastrointestinal disease  
 CSF = cerebral spinal fluid





# The 2010 Cholera Outbreak in Haiti: How Science Solved a Controversy

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## The 2010 Earthquake and Cholera Outbreak in Haiti

On January 12, 2010, a catastrophic 7.0 magnitude earthquake struck Haiti, affecting 3,500,000 people [1,2]. This severely damaged an already marginal public sanitation system, creating ideal conditions for outbreaks of major infectious diseases. In October 2010, nine months after the earthquake, an outbreak of cholera started, which quickly spread all across the country [3]. As of January 7, 2014, 8,534 deaths and 697,256 cholera cases have been reported by the Haitian Ministry of Public Health and Population [4]. Prior to 2010, there was no reported history of cholera in Haiti, despite devastating outbreaks in the Caribbean region in the 19<sup>th</sup> century [5]. Many wondered where the cholera in Haiti came from. Two hypotheses as to its origin were presented. The climatic hypothesis argued that nonpathogenic *Vibrio cholerae*, indigenous in the coastal waters of Haiti, was given the right environmental circumstances and evolved into a pathogenic strain [6]. On the other hand, the human transmission hypothesis suggested that cholera was introduced to Haiti by individuals infected in a foreign country.

## Cholera and *V. cholerae*

Cholera, caused by *V. cholerae*, is a disease characterized by very severe diarrhea and dehydration, which can lead to death in less than 48 hours if left untreated. Cholera is treatable through oral rehydration salt solutions, intravenous fluids, or antibiotics, depending on severity [7]. Ingestion of contaminated water is the main vehicle for human infection. The principal virulence determinant is the potent cholera toxin, encoded by the *ctxAB* genes on the bacteriophage CTX $\phi$  [8] found in toxigenic *V. cholerae* genomes. The toxin, together with other virulence factors, leads to the harmful effects of the *V. cholerae* infection (Figure 1). These auxiliary virulence factors are encoded in clusters of genes called genomic islands, which are acquired by environmental *V. cholerae* through horizontal gene transfer [9] (Figure 1). It is also important to note that infection can be asymptomatic, and these cases play a major role in the transmission of the disease [10]. *V. cholerae* is of major public health concern because of its potential to cause pandemics. Seven such pandemics have been recorded since 1817, when cholera first spread beyond the Indian subcontinent, all presumably caused by *V. cholerae* belonging to the O1 serogroup. *V. cholerae* of the classical biotype dominated the previous six pandemics and was replaced by the El Tor biotype in the currently ongoing seventh pandemic, which originated in Southeast Asia in 1961 [7]. In 1992, a new serogroup of *V. cholerae*, O139, was first identified after causing cholera epidemics in India and Bangladesh [11]. Cholera has been eliminated from industrialized countries by efficient water and sewage treatments but not in less-developed countries with poor water sanitation.

## Initial Studies Support the Human Transmission Hypothesis

Rumors spread on October 27, 2010, pointing blame for the outbreak at the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) troops from Nepal who had recently set up camp in Meille, a small village 2 km south of Mirebalais (Figure 2A). This followed revelations by news reporters showing improper sewage waste disposal in the camp [12,13].

The stool samples collected by the Haiti National Public Health Laboratory from cholera patients at the start of the outbreak were sent to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) for analysis. On November 13, the CDC reported that *V. cholerae* El Tor O1 was isolated from the samples and independent isolates were indistinguishable by multiple rapid phenotypic and molecular characterization methods, suggesting that a single strain caused the outbreak and was likely introduced into Haiti in one event [14].

A study by Piarroux and colleagues made use of all available epidemiological data, checking hospital records, doing field surveys, and applying statistics for spatiotemporal analysis, to trace the source and spread of the outbreak [15]. The findings of their investigation confirmed the news reporters' claims. Based on all gathered evidence, they put together a likely scenario – the MINUSTAH camp contaminated the Meille tributary with fecal matter by their unsanitary practice of sewage drainage, and the Meille tributary connects downstream to the Latem River that goes through the town of Mirebalais, the site of the first reported cholera case [16]. The Latem River eventually connects to the Artibonite River, the longest as well as the most important river that spans Haiti (Figure 2A). The movement and spread of cholera in the early onset of the epidemic was closely linked to proximity with the Artibonite River.

**Citation:** Orata FD, Keim PS, Boucher Y (2014) The 2010 Cholera Outbreak in Haiti: How Science Solved a Controversy. *PLoS Pathog* 10(4): e1003967. doi:10.1371/journal.ppat.1003967

**Editor:** Joseph Heitman, Duke University Medical Center, United States of America

**Published:** April 3, 2014

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**Funding:** This work was supported by the Integrated Microbial Biodiversity Program of the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR) and the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada (NSERC) to FDO and YB. PSK was supported by the Northern Arizona University Cowden Endowment for Microbiology. The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.

**Competing Interests:** The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.

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# ***SINGLE (FOREIGN) SOURCE HYPOTHESIS***



<http://solutionshaiti.blogspot.com/>



**Outbreak Isolates Sequenced  
(9 Total)**

Jan 26

3 cases  
late Oct


Case 1  
Oct.  
19

PFGE  
Variants

MINU  
STAH

Nov 27

2011





## ***PulseNet USA***


**12 Recent OUTBREAK  
& Travel-Associated  
PFGE Matches**

# Core gene phylogeny (4,376 SNPs in 632 orthologues)

**Tool(s):**


Core hqSNP Pipeline





# Core gene phylogeny

With Hendriksen et al.



	log P(model data)	S.E.	Constant	Expanding	Exponential
Constant	-296.61	0.232	-	-4.243	-4.342
Expansion	-286.841	0.156	4.243	-	-0.099
exponential	-286.613	0.188	4.342	0.099	-





Figure S5. Molecular clock.



# Canada's GRDI Interdepartmental Pilot Project for Food & Water Safety



- Developing an integrated analytical system for 'omic data querying & visualization
- Establishing a national enteric bacterial pathogens database
- Delivering novel detection platforms
- Modernizing source attribution & risk assessment methods

**NML PHG Program**


**GRDI FWS: \$7.2M over 4 y**  
**IRIDA: \$1.5M over 3 y**

**Danish Technical University**

**€6M PoC Global Data Sharing**

**Patho-NGen-Trace Consortium**

**€6M over 5y, WGS for Disease Surveillance**



**CDC AMD Program**

**\$30M/yr for 2014-19**  
**\$150 M total**

**USFDA, UC Davis, NCBI**  
**100K Genomes / Genome**  
**Trackr**

**100K Genomes UK**  
**€100M**

**EU Horizon 2020**

**Personalizing Health & Care**  
**PHC-7: "Improving the control of infectious epidemics and foodborne outbreaks through rapid identification of pathogens"**  
**PHC-2014: €20M**

**US CDC: expects to drop ALL traditional, molecular lab testing within ~5 years (foodborne)**


# GRDI FWS Platform

1. WGS database system and application ontology for infectious disease genomic epidemiology
2. Bioinformatics tools and pipelines for analysis of WGS data
3. *In silico* typing tools and linking of WGS data to microbial sequence typing databases
4. Training




# IRIDA Platform Expansion

1. IRIDA: Integrated Rapid Infectious Disease Analysis
2. 1.56M, 3 year Genome Canada Large-Scale Applied Platform Grant
3. SFU / BCCDC / PHAC-NML / Dalhousie
4. Expands the GRDI platform to include additional epidemiology and pathogenomic analysis functionality, and additional training
5. Implementation in provincial public health labs
6. Training




# Federated Database Design




# Data Model

- Based on NCBI
- Project
- Sample
- Data Sources
  - Sequence File
  - Experiment
  - Run
- Analysis
  - Workflow
  - Analysis File



# Ontologies and Data Standards



Your Projects

All Users

All Projects

Projects ▼

Samples ▼

Projects <

Samples <


Files

Project Name	Sample Name	File Name	Date Created	
Nmg_ST269	<input type="checkbox"/> FWS-EC-0302	FWS-EC-0288_S8_L001_R1_001.fastq	Mar 03, 2014 12:39:45 PM	
S_Heidelberg	<input type="checkbox"/> FWS-EC-0303	FWS-EC-0288_S8_L001_R2_001.fastq	Mar 03, 2014 12:40:24 PM	
Mouse adaptation of MAR	<input type="checkbox"/> FWS-EC-0304			
GRDI_FWS_VTEC	<input type="checkbox"/> FWS-EC-0305			
Unknown hepatitis from s	<input type="checkbox"/> FWS-EC-0278			
Nmg_Miseq_Mate-pair	<input type="checkbox"/> FWS-EC-0286			
2010Listeria_resequenc	<input type="checkbox"/> FWS-EC-0294			
MeV_D4_Nov 2012	<input type="checkbox"/> FWS-EC-0279			
Listeria_1981-87	<input type="checkbox"/> FWS-EC-0287			
JCV RISC pulldown	<input type="checkbox"/> FWS-EC-0295			
Shigella sonnei Dec2013	<input type="checkbox"/> FWS-EC-0280			
Poxvirus Quasispecies for	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> FWS-EC-0288			
Legionella_longbeachae	<input type="checkbox"/> FWS-EC-0296			
GW_odd_Ecoli	<input type="checkbox"/> FWS-EC-0281			
test_enterics_metagenomi	<input type="checkbox"/> FWS-EC-0289			
S_Dublin	<input type="checkbox"/> FWS-EC-0297			
Listeria_1988	<input type="checkbox"/> FWS-EC-0282			
LiDS_project	<input type="checkbox"/> FWS-EC-0290			
Special_Bact	<input type="checkbox"/> FWS-EC-0298			
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Chlamydia_CT135	<input type="checkbox"/> FWS-EC-0284			
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GRDI_FWS_Provincial_Part	<input type="checkbox"/> FWSEC0001			
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
FWS-EC-0288\_S8\_L001\_R2\_001.fastq

**File Type** Conventional base calls  
**Date Created** Mar 03, 2014 12:40:24 PM  
**Date Modified** Mar 03, 2014 12:40:24 PM  
**Total Sequences** 886391  
**GC Content** 50  
**Maximum Length** 301  
**Minimum Length** 35  
**Filtered Sequences** 0


Per Sequence Quality Score Chart



Per Base Quality Score Chart



Duplication Level Chart



Administrator Administrator




My Account

Help

Logout




# SNP Phylogenomics




# Genomic Island Detection

*Pseudomonas aeruginosa* LESB58 chromosome




<http://www.pathogenomics.sfu.ca/islandviewer>

# Phylogeography




[http://kiwi.cs.dal.ca/GenGIS/Main\\_Page](http://kiwi.cs.dal.ca/GenGIS/Main_Page)





# Microbial In Silico Typing (MIST) Pipeline



# TyPon


- 24 classes
- 18 object properties
- 26 data properties.
- 5 datatypes





# Global Microbial Identifier

ABOUT GMI PEOPLE WORKGROUPS NEWS & EVENTS CONTACT




A system as is envisioned would benefit those tackling individual problems at the frontline (clinicians, veterinarian, etc) as well as other stakeholders (i.e. policy-makers, regulators, industry, etc). By enabling access to this global resource, a professional response on health threats will be within reach of all countries with basic laboratory infrastructure.

## 6th Meeting on GMI



The purpose of the meeting will be to determine a path forward for how to establish a globally distributed system and follow up on previous meeting: [Read more about the meeting](#)

## Work Group 4 survey



Please help shape the future GMI proficiency testing programme by taking the time to answer a few questions. [Read more about the survey](#)

NEWSLETTERS FROM THE GMI STEERING COMMITTEE [All](#)

GMI MEETINGS [All](#)

ICG 2013

# Acknowledgments

## Bioinformatics:

- Dr. Fiona Brinkman, SFU
- Dr. William Hsiao, BCCDC
- Dr. Robert Beiko
- Dr. Eduardo Taboada
- Dr. João Andre Carrico
- Dr. Ben Liang
- Dr. Natalie Knox
- Dr. Melanie Courtot
- Dr. Lynn Schriml
- Heather Kent
- Eric Enns
- Philip Mabon
- Franklin Bristow
- Thomas Matthews
- Shane Thiessen
- Paul Williams
- Josh Adam
- Aaron Petkau
- Matthew Stuart-Edwards
- Brendan Curran-Johnson
- Jessica Forbes
- Shivani Gupta
- Julie Shay
- Emma Griffiths
- Damion Dooley

## Special Thanks:

- Dr. Celine Nadon
- Aleisha Reimer
- Lorilee Tescher
- Dr. Chrystal Berry
- Dr. Matt Gilmour
- Dr. Morag Graham
- Shaun Tyler
- Matt Walker
- Dr. Lee Katz
- Dr. Cheryl Tarr
- Dr. Peter Gerner-Smidt
- Bob Conarroe
- Harvey Ulrich
- Adam Olson