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Fred Gould North Carolina State University



Hopes and Fears
Types of gene drive systems
Mechanisms behind unrestricted drives
Mechanisms behind spatially restricted drives
Problem formulation



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А Multitude of Hopes

Aiding Immunizing Threatened Animal Reservoirs Species of Disease Safely Controlling Gene Drives and Transgenes Human Health Environment Controlling Controlling **RNA-Guided** Vector-Borne Invasive Gene Drives Disease Species New Tools for Sustainable Nontoxic Ecology Pesticides & Pest Herbicides Management Agriculture Esvelt et al. 2014 and the set of the set

Malaria

435,000 Deaths 219,000,000 Cases \$ 3.1 Billion Cost (US)



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435,000 Deaths 219,000,000 Cases \$ 3.1 Billion Cost (US)



A Vector Control Research Alliance



The Fears



A Vector Control Research Alliance

Ecosystem disruption
Resurgence
Others



Eradicate Invasives



Of bird, amphibian, mammal, and reptile extinctions



Eradicate Invasives





Of bird, amphibian, mammal, and reptile extinctions





Global House Mouse Distribution





1) Hopes and Fears

2) Types of gene drive systems

3) Mechanisms behind unrestricted drives
4) Mechanisms behind spatially restricted drives
5) Problem formulation

Impact on Population

Suppression Replacement



Spread Characteristic

Impact on Population

Suppression Replacement



Spread Characteristic











Threshold Restricted Gene Drive

Threshold Restricted Gene Drive

Temporally Restricted Gene Drive

Threshold Restricted Gene Drive

Temporally Restricted Gene Drive

Impact on Population

Suppression Replacement



Spread Characteristic

Replacement

Number of Individuals



Number of Individuals



Time

The Mechanism Behind the Magic

The Mechanism Behind the Magic

The Mechanism Behind the Magic

Spatially Unrestricted Gene Drives

CRISPR for Crop Breeding

CRISPR for Gene Drive





Non-Homologous End-Joining (NHEJ)

Homology-Directed Repair (HDR)
Homology-Directed Repair (HDR)

Chromosome



A DE ALIA Non-Homologous End-Joining (NHEJ)

Chromosome















Homology-Directed Repair (HDR)



Slide series adapted from Gantz and Bier 2015









Chromosome segment with target sequence



Chromosome segment with target sequence

Plasmid with

desired gene



Chromosome segment with target sequence

Plasmid with

desired gene





















CRISPR for Gene Drive













D

second allele



D second allele

Homologue #2

- gRNA Cas9





March 2015

Sciencexpress

The mutagenic chain reaction: A method for converting heterozygous to homozygous mutations

Valentino M. Gantz* and Ethan Bier*

Wild Type or Heterozygote

Homozygous mutant


























Super-Mendelian Inheritance















mpact on Population

Suppression Replacement



Spread Characteristic

Impact on Population

Suppression Replacement



Spread Characteristic





Locally Fixed Alleles: A method to localize gene drive to island populations

Jaye Sudweeks, Brandon Hollingsworth, Dimitri V. Blondel, Karl J. Campbell, Sumit Dhole, John D. Eisemann, Owain Edwards, John Godwin, Gregg R. Howald, Kevin Oh, Antoinette J. Piaggio, Thomas A. A. Prowse, Joshua V. Ross, J. Royden Saah, Aaron B. Shiels, Paul Thomas, David W. Threadgill, Michael R. Vella, Fred Gould, Alun L. Lloyd

doi: https://doi.org/10.1101/509364



Island

TTGCCACACAAGTGAGAGGACTTGAGTTCAGATCCCCCCAAGCCTGTGGAAAGCTA TTGCCACACAAGTGAGAGGACTTGAGTTCAGATCCCCCCAAGCCTGTGGAAAGCTA

TTGCCACACAAGTGAGAGGACTTGAGTTCAGATCCCCCCAAGCCTGTGGAAAGCTA

Mainland

TTGCCACACAAGTGAGAGGACTTGAGTTCAGATCCCCCCAAGCCTGTGGAAAGCTA TTGCCACACAAGTGAGAGGACTTGAGTTCAGATCCCCCCAAGCCTGTGGAAAGCTA TTGCCACACAAGTGAGAGGACTTGAGTTCAGATCCCCCCAAGCCTGTGGAAAGCTA

TTGCCACACAAGTGAGAGGACTTGAGTTCAGATCCCCCCTAGCCTGTGGAAAGCTA TTGCCACACAAGTGAGAGGACTTGAGTTCAGATCCCCCCCAAGCCTGTGGAAAGCTA TTGCCACACAAGTGAGAGGACTTGAGTTCAGATCCCCCCTAGCCTGTGGAAAGCTA

TTGCCACACAAGTGAGAGGACTTGAGTTCAGATCCCCCCAAGCCTGTGGAAAGCTA TTGCCACACAAGTGAGAGGACTTGAGTTCAGATCCCCCCAAGCCTGTGGAAAGCTA TTGCCACACAAGTGAGAGGACTTGAGTTCAGATCCCCCCAAGCCTGTGGAAAGCTA TTGCCACACAAGTGAGAGGACTTGAGTTCAGATCCCCCCAAGCCTGTGGAAAGCTA TTGCCACACAAGTGAGAGGACTTGAGTTCAGATCCCCCCCAGCCTGTGGAAAGCTA TTGCCACACAAGTGAGAGGACTTGAGTTCAGATCCCCCCCAAGCCTGTGGAAAGCTA TTGCCACACAAGTGAGAGGACTTGAGTTCAGATCCCCCCAAGCCTGTGGAAAGCTA TTGCCACACAAGTGAGAGGACTTGAGTTCAGATCCCCCCAAGCCTGTGGAAAGCTA TTGCCACACAAGTGAGAGGACTTGAGTTCAGATCCCCCCAAGCCTGTGGAAAGCTA

Island



Island









Mainland

TTGCCACACAAGTGAGAGGACTTGAGTTCAGATCCCCCCAAGCCTGTGGAAAGCTA TTGCCACACAAGTGAGAGGACTTGAGTTCAGATCCCCCCAAGCCTGTGGAAAGCTA TTGCCACACAAGTGAGAGGACTTGAGTTCAGATCCCCCCAAGCCTGTGGAAAGCTA

TTGCCACACAAGTGAGAGGACTTGAGTTCAGATCCCCCCTAGCCTGTGGAAAGCTA TTGCCACACAAGTGAGAGGACTTGAGTTCAGATCCCCCCCAAGCCTGTGGAAAGCTA TTGCCACACAAGTGAGAGGACTTGAGTTCAGATCCCCCCTAGCCTGTGGAAAGCTA

TTGCCACACAAGTGAGAGGACTTGAGTTCAGATCCCCCCAAGCCTGTGGAAAGCTA TTGCCACACAAGTGAGAGGACTTGAGTTCAGATCCCCCCAAGCCTGTGGAAAGCTA TTGCCACACAAGTGAGAGGACTTGAGTTCAGATCCCCCCAAGCCTGTGGAAAGCTA TTGCCACACAAGTGAGAGGACTTGAGTTCAGATCCCCCCAAGCCTGTGGAAAGCTA TTGCCACACAAGTGAGAGGACTTGAGTTCAGATCCCCCCAAGCCTGTGGAAAGCTA TTGCCACACAAGTGAGAGGACTTGAGTTCAGATCCCCCCAAGCCTGTGGAAAGCTA TTGCCACACAAGTGAGAGGACTTGAGTTCAGATCCCCCCAAGCCTGTGGAAAGCTA TTGCCACACAAGTGAGAGGACTTGAGTTCAGATCCCCCCAAGCCTGTGGAAAGCTA TTGCCACCACAAGTGAGAGGACTTGAGTTCAGATCCCCCCAAGCCTGTGGAAAGCTA





Threshold Restricted Gene Drive

Threshold Restricted Gene Drive



Underdominance

Aa

aa





Engineered Underdominance – No cost



Large numbers of transgenic genotypes released

A transgenic Individual is likely to mate with another transgenic individual

A wildtype individual is likely to mate with a transgenic individual



Engineered Underdominance – No cost





Hopes and Fears 2) Types of gene drive systems Mechanisms behind unrestricted drives (CRISPR) 3 A) Current state of the art **B)** Models of spread 4) Mechanisms behind spatially restricted drives (Fixed alleles/Underdominance) A) Current state of the art B) Models of spread **Problem formulation**

Problem Formulation

1) Formally devise plausible pathways that describe how the deployment of gene drive modified insects could be harmful

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2) Formulate risk hypotheses about the likelihood and severity of such events

3) Identify the information that will be useful to test these risk hypotheses.



When "devising plausible pathways" keep in mind that....

Not All Gene Drives Are Created Equal